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  1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
 
Sustainable development including conserving biological diversity (biodiversity) has 
become a key objective of the international community in recent times. Sustainable 
development is commonly defined as ‘development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’1. The  
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity are key elements of sustainable 
development2. It has come to the attention of the global community that biodiversity is 
being lost at a rapid rate3. Consequently steps have been taken to alleviate this problem. 
The Convention Biological Diversity (CBD) which came into force in 1993 is the 
principle treaty that States have ratified in an effort to conserve biodiversity.  
 
The CBD aims to conserve biodiversity, sustainably use its components and fairly and 
equitably share the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources4. Benefit 
sharing may take many forms, for example through monetary benefits or the imparting 
of knowledge. Technology transfer (TT) is envisaged as a tool for obtaining the 
objectives of the CBD and also as a benefit to be shared under the benefit-sharing 
provisions.  
 
The CBD makes it clear that technology is a key mechanism for objectives of the CBD 
being, the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and benefit sharing. In 
achieving its objectives the CBD refers to two types of technology: technology which 
                                                 
1 Brundtland Report, 1987 
2 Pronk at 5 
3 Powers at 103 
4 Article 1, CBD 
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conserves biodiversity (usually environmentally sound technology5) and technology 
which sustainably uses the components of biodiversity including using genetic resources 
(biotechnology)6. As is recognised in the CBD such technology may be subject to 
intellectual property rights. The WTO agreement, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) governs intellectual property rights providing 
global minimum standards of protection. Although not specifically stated, it can be 
implied that TRIPS also recognises technology as playing an important role in the 
sustainable development of all States7. TRIPS recognises that developing countries 
require a sound technological base and this may be achieved through encouraging 
developed countries to transfer technology to them8.  
 
While these two agreements both recognise the value of technology to sustainable 
development, their objectives and methods of approaching sustainable development 
differ. The CBD attempts to achieve this goal through the transfer of technology and 
while it recognises that intellectual property rights (IPRs) may apply to such 
technology9, States shall ensure that such rights do not interfere with the attainment of 
the objectives to the convention10. TRIPS considers it important that IPRs are 
recognised and enforced in order to foster innovation and encourage TT. Further
CBD recognises that IPRs may inhibit the transfer of technology and accordingly point
out that IPRs should not be used in a manner that runs counter to the objectives of t
CBD11 (such as inhibiting TT which is one method of obtaining the objectives). Given 
these differing approaches it appears that there may be a conflict between the provisions 
of TRIPS and the CBD. Commentators have pointed out several possible areas of 
conflict between the two agreements. One such conflict relates to the benefit sharing 
 
5 Biotechnology also has a role to play in conserving biodiversity and is common in determining the 
sustainable use of biodiversity by providing knowledge of genetic resources etc.  
6 See article 1 and 16, CBD. 
7 see articles 66 and 67, TRIPS.  
8 Article 66(2), TRIPS 
9 Article 16(2), CBD 
10 Article 16(5), CBD 
11 Article 16(5), CBD 
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provisions and technology transfer under the CBD12 on the one side and the provisions 
relating to patentability and the exclusive rights granted to the right holders under 
TRIPS13 on the other.  
  
It is important that countries are able to implement the TT provisions under the CBD 
and obtain the maximum benefit from those provisions in order that the objectives of the 
CBD are fully carried out. Generally it is developing countries that have the greatest 
biodiversity and it is generally developed countries that have the technology to exploit 
that biodiversity in a sustainable manner and conserve it. The CBD envisages a system 
whereby the developing nations, in exchange for access to their biodiversity, are able to 
obtain vital technology. However, TRIPS envisages a private property regime whereby 
the holders of IPRs of such technology have exclusive rights over the technology. It is 
important to note that there are limited exceptions to the exclusive rights granted to right 
holders within TRIPS14. These exceptions may provide States with a necessary loophole 
in order to implement the CBD.   
 
It is clear that genetic resources are big business with “…genetic resources and their 
derivatives fetch(ing) prices that range from just a few cents to tens of millions of 
dollars per kg, and often command prices far higher than standard indicators of value 
such as gold”15. Given this fact, if the CBD is implemented to its full extent, both 
developing and developed nations stand to benefit. The developing nations provide 
access to their genetic resources in return for the transfer of technology and possibly 
other benefits. In return for transferring their technology (and providing other benefits) 
developed States (or firms within the developed states) gain access to the genetic 
resources which they can use to make a profit.  
 
 
12 Article 16, CBD 
13 Article 27, TRIPS 
14 Article 8,30 and 31, TRIPS  
15 Kate & Laird at 2 
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Despite the benefits from implementing the CBD “only a few (States) (variously 
estimated between 12 and 23 countries) have adopted substantive…legislation”16.  It has 
been thought that “…the primary factor preventing completion and adoption of 
…(benefit sharing) legislation was not a lack of interest but rather basic legal inability to 
develop effective enforceable implementing legislation on the basis of the still-
incomplete conceptual development of this issue”17. It is therefore important that the 
conflict be resolved in order that the CBD may be implemented in order to carry out its 
objectives. As noted by  Wolfrum:  
“The effectiveness of international environmental agreements can be significantly 
curtailed if conflicts between agreements lead to uncertainty concerning their 
interpretation and, consequently, their implementation and overall application in the 
field of international environmental law”18.  
 
There is potential that the CBD and TRIPS Agreement can complement each other and 
facilitate the transfer of technology, if the parties are able to implement the provisions 
under both treaties without breaching the other. It is important that IPRs are protected in 
order to induce innovation and on the other hand it is important that developing nations 
have access to technology in order to continue to sustainably develop and conserve 
biodiversity.  
 
1.1.1 Outline 
 
This paper addresses the issue of the possible conflict between the TT provisions in the 
CBD and the IP rights protected by TRIPS. The purpose is to determine whether or not a 
conflict actually exists and to suggest ways in which developing countries may 
implement the TT provisions of the CBD without violating their obligations under 
TRIPS.  
 
 
16 Young at 5 
17 Young, T, “Synthesis: The Results and Conclusions of the ABS Project’s First Year of Work in -
Preparation for COP-7 and the International Regime”, 2002 in Young at 5 
18 Wolfrum & Matz at 3 
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Section 2 of this paper provides some background information on TRIPS, the CBD and 
the importance of TT. It also discusses the issue of defining a conflict.  Section 3 
discusses whether a conflict between the TT provisions of the CBD and provisions of 
the TRIPS do in fact exist. It will also be explored as to whether the potential conflict 
can be resolved through interpretation or reconciliation thereby avoiding the need to 
explore traditional conflict resolution techniques such as those outlined in article 30 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Section 4 makes suggestions of ways in 
which developing countries may proceed to implement the TT provisions of the CBD 
without violating TRIPS. Two methods are suggested: implementing national legislation 
and entering into private agreements.  
 
TRIPS relates to many types of IPR protection including patents, trademarks, copyright, 
geographical indications and others. Other forms of intellectual property protection also 
exist such as through the use of trade secrets and plant breeder rights. I have chosen to 
focus upon the use of patents as patents are commonly used to protect biotechnology and 
other technologies that relate to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. It is 
possible, however, to apply the same arguments presented to other types of IP protection 
mentioned in TRIPS.  
 
The aim of the paper is to focus upon ways in which state parties to the CBD may 
implement the provisions of the CBD without violating their obligations under TRIPS. 
In light of this purpose, the focus of the paper is on the perspective of the WTO and how 
it might interpret TRIPS in light of the CBD. If a dispute arose, it is likely that such 
dispute would be brought before the WTO dispute settlement body on the grounds that 
provisions of the TRIPS have been violated by the State19.  
 
 
19 It is also entirely possible that a  State is hiding behind their obligations under TRIPS as an excuse not 
to implement the provisions of the CBD and therefore perhaps that State is breaching the CBD. However, 
I have chosen to focus upon the situation of a State which implements the provisions of the CBD. In doing 
so, it will be shown that it is possible to implement the CBD without violating TRIPS and accordingly 
States who argue that their obligations under TRIPS prevent the implementation of the CBD are in actual 
fact breaching their obligations under the CBD.     
  6 
1.1.2 Methodology 
 
I have taken primarily a doctrinal approach analysing the literature written on the topic 
including reports of International organisations and other sources such as textbooks and 
journal articles. Further I have relied upon primary materials, namely the legal texts of 
the CBD and TRIPS. I have also considered jurisprudential findings of international 
courts and the WTO Dispute Body. 
  7 
  
2 Background 
 
2.1 The purpose of TRIPS and its impact on Technology Transfer 
 
The aim of TRIPS as set out in the preamble is to provide effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights to reduce distortions and impediments to trade. 
TRIPS envisages that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology20.  
 
Under TRIPS a holder of an invention or process is given the exclusive right to exploit 
that invention/process for a specified period of time. In return for that exclusive right the 
holder must disclose the formula or idea behind the product/process21. “The stated 
purpose of IPRs is to stimulate innovation by offering higher monetary returns than the 
market otherwise might provide”22. It is also stated that the exclusivity the holder has is 
in order for that person to recoup their costs of research and development. Thus IPRs, in 
theory, encourage innovation and the sharing of information.  
 
According to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, IPRs are protected for 6 
main reasons being, 1. encourage and reward creative work, 2. technological innovation, 
3. fair competition, 4. consumer protection, 5. transfer of technology and 6. balance of 
rights and obligations23. The theory is that if inventors are able to prevent others from 
copying their inventions and are rewarded for those inventions they are more likely to 
                                                 
20 See article 7 TRIPS 
21 Walker at 9 
22 Kothari and Anuradha at 3 
23 see http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_backgrnd_e/c5s4_e.htm 
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continue developing/innovating and will share their ideas with others who can then 
improve upon them. It is argued that without the protection of IPRs the holders of IPRs 
would have no incentive to invent and/or would not share their knowledge. The sharing 
of knowledge leads to further developments at a more rapid pace than might otherwise 
have been.   
 
There is evidence to suggest that the granting of IPRs does in fact stimulate innovation 
in developed countries24. There is, however, little evidence that it stimulates innovation 
in developing countries25. The reason for this may be that developing countries lack the 
necessary resources, have weak technological capacity, and little knowledge and 
expertise for innovation26. 
 
According to the IPR Commission: “The conferring of IP rights is an instrument of 
public policy, which should be designed so that the benefit to society (for instance 
through the invention of a new drug or technology) outweighs the cost to society (for 
instance, the higher costs of a drug and the cost of administering the IP system)”27.  
TRIPS attempts to do this by granting private rights to IPR holders but also recognizing 
that public interests must be protected. Such public interests include the protection of 
public health and nutrition and the promotion of sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development28. Public interests may also include the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity as a means of sustainable development.   
 
There are arguments that TRIPS has not achieved its objective of balancing public and 
private rights. In recent years the IPR regime has become stronger. “.. the level, scope, 
territorial extent, and role of IP protection have expanded at an unprecedented pace…. 
IP rights have been modified or created to cover new technologies, particularly 
 
24 An example of this is the US’s Bayh Dole Act “which allowed universities to retain profits flowing 
from the exercise of patent rights, which resulted in an increase in the number of patent applications by 
encouraging inventiveness” (Curci, 2005 at 41) 
25 See IPR Commission at 4  
26 Ibid 
27 ibid at 3 
28 see Article 8, TRIPS 
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biotechnology…”29. An example of this expansion includes the patenting of the Onco-
mouse, a genetically engineered mouse created for the purpose of cancer research30. The 
stronger IPR regime has seen a more favorable approach taken towards technology 
holders while users are ignored31. That is by granting such wide private rights to the IPR 
holder, they are able to raise the costs of the product thereby ignoring the rights of the 
user for example to the necessities of life for example food or to life saving medicines32.  
 
Walker is of the view that stronger IPRs “could result in barriers to technology transfer 
in three ways: 
 
1. Strong IPR protection can lead to high prices for technology; 
2. strong protection can allow technology holders to negotiate conditions for transfer 
that are unfavourable to technology users and may even amount in anti-
competitive practices; and 
3. strong protection can provide technology holders with the means to exclude 
technology users from accessing technology”33. 
 
There are arguments also that a strong IPR regime encourages the transfer of 
technology. TRIPS, therefore, has an important role to play in relation to the transfer of 
such technology.  
“In theory, guaranteed protection of IPRs could encourage risk-averse technology 
holders to set up joint ventures or wholly-owned subsidiaries in another country through 
which technology might be transferred. Alternatively, IPR protection can encourage 
companies to seek technology partners in other countries through the negotiation of 
 
29 IPR Commission at 1 
30 A patent was granted in the USA to Harvard University for its genetically modified mouse, the Onco-
Mouse. This was the first time that a genetically modified animal was considered to be an invention and 
allowed the patenting of life forms.  Other countries have followed this lead.  (Curci,2002, at 10). 
31As an example pharmaceutical companies are able to charge high prices for their products and enforce 
their rights to prevent others making cheap generic versions, ignoring the need of the public (the users) 
who require the product for their health but cannot afford to pay. 
32 see IPR Commission at 3 
33 Walker at 18 
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licensing agreements. In particular, strong IPR Protection could encourage small and 
medium- sized companies that lack the resources to set up subsidiaries off-shore and so 
rely on licensing IPRs to introduce technology to new markets”34.   
 
There is some doubt, however, as to whether the IPR protection provided by TRIPS has 
in fact contributed to the increased transfer of technology35. According to an UNCTAD 
study on TRIPS and developing countries:  
“To date, there is little conclusive evidence that strengthened intellectual property 
protection would consistently expand the transfer of technology to developing countries. 
Key determinants of TT (through FDI and through arm’s-length licensing) include the 
costs of making such transfers, which depend on local technological capability. This 
capability refers to factors such as skill availability, technology supply structures, R&D 
capacity, enterprise-level competence and institutional and other supporting 
technological infrastructures”36.  
 
There are provisions within TRIPS which aim at preventing IPRs from being 
monopolized in a manner contrary to the objectives of TRIPS and particularly in a 
manner which excludes TT. Article 8(2) provides that “appropriate measures… may be 
needed to prevent … the resort to practices which …  adversely affect the international 
transfer of technology”. Further, Article 31 of TRIPS allows for compulsory licensing in 
certain circumstances. Some have argued that it “holds significant potential for the 
protection of public interest… for gaining access to new technologies necessary for 
development”37. Article 66(2) of TRIPS also provides that developed countries shall 
provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of 
promoting and encouraging TT to least-developed countries in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base. The extent of the implication of this 
provision is unsure. Further, even if developed states provide the incentives there is 
nothing compelling institutions or enterprises to take up the incentive.  
 
34 Ibid at 17 
35 Walker at 15-16  
36 UNCTAD: 1996 “TRIPS and developing countries”. New York and Geneva: UNCTAD at  18 in Khor 
at 89 
37 Walker at 19 
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There are many differing views as to the extent that IPR protection encourages the 
transfer of technology. It is generally recognized that some form of IPR protection is 
necessary as IPR holders are less likely to be willing to transfer their technology if there 
is a possibility that their invention could be copied. It is possible to strike a balance 
between the rights of the IP holder and the rights of the user. The way in which TRIPS is 
implemented will play an important role in reaching this balance. 
 
2.2 The Purpose of the CBD and the importance of Biodiversity 
 
The CBD aims to conserve biodiversity and ensure the sustainable use of its 
components. Biodiversity is defined in the CBD as “the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic 
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity 
within species, between species and of ecosystems”38.   
 
Biodiversity is important to the continued survival of humankind as biodiversity 
provides a large number of goods and services that sustain our lives39.  
“The most widely accepted definition for conservation of biodiversity, presented in 1980 
in World Conservation Strategy by the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources, is “the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may 
yield the greatest sustainable benefit while maintaining its potential to meet the needs 
and aspirations of future generations”40. 
 
Human life on earth is intertwined with other life (both plant and animal) and all forms 
of life are dependent upon each other. The loss of biodiversity can lead to unstable 
environments and further losses of biodiversity. For humans the loss of biodiversity can 
                                                 
38 Article 2, CBD 
39 Convention on Biological Diversity Homepage http://www.biodiv.org/doc/publications/guide.asp 
40 Variety of Life, Biodiversity Web, p. 2 available at www.biodiversity.nl. Biodiversity.htm in Curci 
Staffler, 2002, at 9 
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lead to food shortages and a loss of resources which we rely upon for medicines, shelter, 
transportation, income and other life sustaining resources41.   
 
The preamble to the CBD provides essentially that the parties have recognized that the 
conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind and further that 
it is integral to maintaining life supporting systems as well has having educational, 
recreational, social, economical, scientific, aesthetic, etc value. For those reasons and 
more mentioned in the preamble the parties to the CBD have agreed to carry out the 
objectives of the agreement. The CBD has three main objectives: the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources42.  Conservation is not 
defined in the CBD but is generally understood to mean the steps taken to protect 
biodiversity. The CBD defines two types of conservation, being in situ conservation and 
ex situ conservation. Ex-situ conservation is defined to mean “the conservation of 
components of biological diversity outside their natural habitats”43. An example of ex-
situ conservation is a zoo or seed storage. In-situ conservation is defined to mean “the 
conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of 
viable populations of species in their natural surroundings and, in the case of 
domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed their 
distinctive properties”44. Sustainable use is defined in the Convention to mean “the use 
of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the 
long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the 
needs and aspirations of present and future generations”45.  “Some of the basic features 
of sustainable use include: monitoring of use, management on a flexible basis attuned to 
the goals of observing biological unity, adopting a holistic ecosystem approach, 
restoring areas of depleted biodiversity, adoption of both an integrated and a 
 
41 Environmental Law Institute Research Staff (ELI) at 1  
42 See Article 1 CBD 
43 Article 2, CBD 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
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precautionary approach; ensuring inter-generational equity, basing measures on 
scientific research”46.  
 
According to Venbrux: 
“The CBD approaches conservation based on the theory that what is perceived as having 
economic value tends to be used more efficiently, thus promoting the sustainable use of 
depletable resources. Consequently, the CBD seeks to conserve resources through 
economic incentives and other market mechanisms”47. 
 
TT is perceived to be a main mechanism for achieving the objectives of the CBD48. TT 
has a role to play in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and further can 
be shared as a benefit arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. TT may assist in 
sustainable use of biodiversity by providing a means, for example, for replenishing 
resources. According to Walker,  
“Implementing the objectives of the CBD … relies on the protection and use of 
knowledge, including knowledge of genetic material, knowledge of technology, or the 
knowledge of indigenous and local communities regarding biological diversity. 
Consequently, IPRs, including those required by TRIPS, may affect the implementation 
of the CBD”49.  
 
IPRs have an important role to play in the implementation of the CBD, especially in 
relation to the access and benefit sharing provisions50 (article 15) and in the TT 
provisions (article 16). Article 15 of the convention provides that each party has 
sovereign rights over their natural resources and the authority to determine access rests 
with the sovereign state.  In return for providing access to its genetic resources the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of these resources have to be shared equitably. 
Namely the convention asks for participation in research work and the shifting of such 
 
46 Birnie & Boyle at 576 
47 Venbrux at 4 
48 See article 1, CBD which states the objectives of the convention which are to be achieved “by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies…”. 
49 Walker at 32  
50 Dross and Wolf at 102 
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activities to the countries of origin, for TT, and for participation in the results and 
benefits of genetic resources. In regards to this section IPRs come into play in relation to 
knowledge used and gained in research work, technology which is to be transferred and 
in relation to other benefits such as royalties received from a patented product which 
resulted from genetic resources.  
 
Article 16 of the Convention provides that each contracting party undertakes to provide 
and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other contracting parties of technologies that 
are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use 
of genetic resources. There seems to be some conflict within article 16 itself with article 
16(2) stating that the access to and the transfer of technology shall be provided on terms 
that recognize and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection of IPRs 
while article 16(5) states that parties shall cooperate to ensure that IPRs are supportive 
of and do not run counter to the objectives of the CBD. As pointed out by Venrux: 
“Controversially, article 16(5) acknowledges the importance of intellectual property 
rights but seems to give priority to the transfer of technology”51.  
 
It is these articles which have caused the most controversy between developed and 
developing nations52. In negotiating these provisions a compromise between the desires 
of the developed nations and the desires of the developing nations had to be reached. 
B.E. Tewolde of Ethiopia (a key negotiator) stated that article 16 is  
“… a complex article because it resulted from the conflicting interests of the North, 
which wanted to hang on to its advantages in biotechnology, particularly genetic 
engineering, and the biodiversity-rich South, which wanted TT in exchange. The North 
insisted that TT should be linked to the Northern form of IPRs in order to protect the 
interests of their private sectors, particularly their transnational corporations. 
Conversely, the South wanted to make sure that IPRs do not damage the prospects for 
the conservation and sustainable use of its biodiversity, and insisted on the inclusion of 
paragraph 5”53.   
 
 
51 Venrux at 5 
52 Ibid at 4 
53 Khor at 53 
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The TT provisions and benefit sharing provisions play an important role in the 
sustainable use and conservation of biodiversity. The world’s population is increasing at 
a rapid rate meaning that the demand for food is increasing. It is the developing nations 
that have the greatest number of people without an adequate amount of food. A reason 
for this may be that developing states lack the technology to exploit their biodiversity in 
a sustainable manner. Through the use of technology and especially biotechnology it is 
possible to increase the amount of food produced, for example through pest resistant 
plants or plants that are able to survive with little water. The transfer of such technology 
to developing nations in exchange for access to their genetic resources could give these 
nations the ability to produce more food. “It is only the innovation in terms of recent 
research in the field of biotechnology in the field of agriculture, horticulture and forestry 
that can pave the way to increased production”54. It is the provisions for TT under the 
CBD which may assist in this regard particularly if those provisions are not inhibited by 
IPRs.  
 
Overall,  
“the Convention can be seen as an instrument to promote the equitable exchange, on 
mutually agreed terms, of access to genetic resources and associated knowledge in return 
for finance, technology and the opportunity to participate in research”55. 
 
2.3 The Importance of Technology Transfer 
 
Technology is not defined within either TRIPS or the CBD. The CBD does make 
mention that technology includes biotechnology56. Van Houtte considers that  
“technology is commonly understood as meaning systematic and practical applied 
technical knowledge which is required or useful for the manufacturing of products, for 
the application of operating procedures or production of processes, or even for the 
performance of services”57.  
                                                 
54 Curci, 2002, at 8 
55 Kate & Laird at 4 
56 Article 2 
57 Van Houtte at 203 
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Lesser considers that technology is “the application of knowledge to solving specific 
problems or meeting identified needs”58. 
 
The transfer of technology has been considered to mean “simply the movement of 
technologies to additional applications; transfer may be geographic (the general concept) 
but could also refer to a different product application in the same location”59. TT may be 
affected in a number of ways “including through assignment of the property rights in the 
technology, by granting a licence, through foreign direct investment, and franchising 
and/or turn-key contracts”60. 
 
According to Lesser, “technology is a means to achieve the objectives (of the CBD), and 
TT is a means to provide technologies where needed”61. In particular the transfer of 
technology, both biotechnology and EST, is important in assisting developing nations to 
develop in a sustainable manner62. In addition TT may also be a benefit obtained under 
the benefit sharing provisions of the CBD. In exchange for access to a country’s genetic 
resources the accessor must enter into benefit sharing.  
 
TRIPS also recognises the importance of TT to the development of developing 
countries63. However, there is some doubt as to how successful this provision has been 
in encouraging TT and the actual transfer of technology to developing countries has 
been low.  
“Experience has shown that TRIPS tends to promote the importation of biotechnological 
products and processes into developing countries. Large pharmaceutical corporations 
from developed countries often apply for patents in developing countries but will not 
 
58 Lesser at 2 
59 Ibid 
60 Van Houtte, Hans at 204 and 213 
61 Lesser at 3 
62 Khor at 87. It should also be noted that biotechnology may be harmful to biodiversity and consequently 
sustainable development. This may be through creating mono-cultures (by new ‘super breeds’ of plants 
wiping out traditional breeds). In addition the impact of genetically modified organisms on the 
environment is not yet clearly known. 
63 Article 66(2), TRIPS 
  17 
                                                
physically establish production facilities or research labs inside host countries. Patented 
products, not the technology needed to create them, tend to be transferred, thus defeating 
the capacity-building goals of article 66.”64. 
 
It is widely recognised that technology is particularly important for developing nations 
as they go through the stages of development. In particular technology is important to 
ensure that developing countries develop in a sustainable manner.  The Brundtland 
Report of 1987 considered that the “promotion of sustainable development was strictly 
linked to the development and diffusion of new technologies, especially in the 
agricultural/forests fields, in the use of energy and in pollution control systems”.  
“More precisely, the Report acknowledged the fact that technology is a powerful tool for 
reducing the effects on the environment caused by human activities, and the need was 
strongly pointed out to carry out the proposals through international exchange of 
technology, by means of trade in improved equipment, TT agreements, provision of 
experts and research collaboration”65. 
 
It is crucial for the success of the CBD that developing nations have access to 
technologies which assist in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. If 
technology is transferred to developing countries as a benefit in exchange for access to 
their genetic resources, then both article 15 compelling benefit sharing and article 16 
calling for TT have been fulfilled. That is that a benefit has been shared (the technology) 
and also technology has been transferred as the host country now has access to and the 
use of that technology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Ritchie, Mark, et al. ”Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity: The Industrialisation of Natural 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge” (1996) 11 St John’s Legal Comment 431 at 439 in Venrux at 6 
65 Munari, Francesco. ”Technology Transfer and the Protection of the Environment” in Francioni at 158 
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2.4 What is a Conflict? 
  
“Conflicts between regulations within the same legal system are problematic, from a 
policy point of view, because they interfere with the coherence and, as a result, the 
efficiency of the respective legal system”66.  Accordingly it is preferable that conflicts 
do not occur in the first place, however, it is not always possible to avoid such a 
situation. This is possibly even more problematic in the international legal system which 
to some extent is fragmented. Conventions are generally negotiated in isolation and 
today we find conventions covering a wide range of subject matters. Accordingly, 
overlaps in subject matters occasionally occur.  
 
Defining a “conflict” and consequently determining if a conflict exists between two 
norms has caused many difficulties. There is no clear agreement as to what constitutes a 
conflict and commentators have differing opinions about the definition of a conflict.  
 
According to Pauwelyn some preconditions must exist for a conflict to arise. He 
considers that firstly the subject matter and the parties bound by the two treaties must 
not be completely different; “there must be at least some overlap in terms of subject 
matter and some overlap in terms of state parties”67. The treaties must also exist or 
interact at the same time. Secondly, he states that “one must approach conflict from the 
perspective of a given state…If it is bound by one of the two rules, there can be no 
conflict, at least not from the perspective of that particular state or body… in addition, 
(one)must assess conflict in terms of a legal relationship of that given state with a given 
other state”68. Accordingly, a State faces a potential conflict if it has ratified two treaties 
which have the same subject matter and it now must form a relationship with another 
state in fulfilling its obligations.  
 
If the pre-conditions are in existence then a potential conflict may arise but is there in 
fact a real conflict? Defining “conflict” has been approached in basically two different 
                                                 
66 Wolfrum at 1 
67 Pauwelyn at 165-166 
68 Ibid 
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ways: a strict/ narrow approach and a broader approach. The strict/narrow approach was 
taken by Jenks who defined conflict as arising “only where a party to the two treaties 
cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties” 69.  As an 
example of the broader definition,  Aufricht stated “ a conflict between an earlier and a 
later treaty arises if both deal with the same subject matter in a different manner”70. 
Further to the broad approach Sir Humphrey Waldock in preparing article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention stated “the idea conveyed by that term [conflict] was that of a 
comparison between two treaties which revealed that their clauses, or some of them, 
could not be reconciled with one another”71. Pauwelyn considers that defining conflict 
narrowly solves the problem of the conflict merely by the definition of conflict and not 
by a rule on how to solve the conflict. His work focuses more on how to solve a conflict 
then by specifically defining what it is72.   
 
Wolfrum and Matz define a conflict in a strict sense as relating “to the incompatibility of 
two legal norms. That is to say that one obligation cannot be fulfilled without 
necessarily violating the other”73. They have attempted to broaden that definition by 
stating that: 
“divergences or inconsistencies without establishing contradicting, absolute 
obligations… (which theoretically)could be made compatible without  abolishing the 
substantive content of either of the regulations…. Even these more broadly defined 
conflicts, particularly if the number of potential collisions is taken into account, may 
have the same negative effects as the more narrowly defined conflicts. Since 
contradictions can…. diminish the potential effectiveness of international environmental 
law…”74. 
 
 
69 Jenks, Wilfred, ‘Conflicts of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 BYIL 401 at 426 in Pauwelyn at 167 
70 Aufricht, Hans, ‘Supersession of Treaties in International Law’ (1952) Cornell Law Quarterly 655 at 
655-6  in Pauwelyn at 168 
71 Waldock, Sir Humphrey. YBILC 1964, vol.1, p. 125 in Pauwelyn at 168. 
72 See Pauwelyn at 170-171  
73 Wofrum & Matz at 6 
74 Ibid 
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Sadat-Akhavi states that a conflict of norms arises “when it is impossible to comply with 
all requirements of two norms. The impossibility of complying with two norms implies 
that the norms are mutually exclusive; they cannot coexist in a legal order. Compliance 
with one norm entails non-compliance with the other”75. He goes on to further clarify by 
providing: 
“A conflict of norms arises when two norms cannot be complied with by all addressees 
of the norm, at all times and in all spaces covered by the norm, with regard to all objects 
of the norm, and under all conditions specified by the norm. In other words, to prove that 
two norms are conflicting it suffices to show the impossibility of compliance with the 
norms at least for one person or at one time or in one place with regard to one object or 
under one condition”76. 
 
The WTO panel has also had cause to discuss the issue of defining a conflict, however, 
it too has not reached a decisive conclusion on what constitutes a conflict. In the EC-
Bananas case, the WTO panel defined conflict as including the following situations: 
“(i) clashes between obligations contained in GATT 1994 and obligations contained in 
agreements listed in Annex 1A, where those obligations are mutually exclusive in the 
sense that a member cannot comply with both obligations at the same time and (ii) the 
situation where a rule in one agreement prohibits what a rule in another agreement 
explicitly permits”77.  
The EC- Bananas case recognised that it was possible to avoid a conflict in a situation 
where one article of a treaty permitted an action and the other prohibited the same action 
by simply not exercising the permission. However, it went on to state that  
“…such an interpretation would render whole Articles or sections of Agreements 
covered by the WTO meaningless and would run counter to the object and purpose of 
many agreements listed in Annex 1A which were negotiated with the intent to create 
rights and obligations which in parts differ substantially from those of the GATT 
1994.”78.  
 
75 Sadat-Akhavi at 5 
76 Ibid at 7 
77 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (WT/DS27) 
(25 September 1997) at para. 7.159 in Pauwelyn at 190 
78 EC-Bananas at Footnote 728 in Pauwelyn at 191   
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It must be noted, however, that the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body have not always 
followed this view. In the Indonesia-Autos Case79 the panel “did not consider a situation 
of an obligation contradicting a right to be a conflict”80. The Panel provided a definition 
of conflict in the following terms: “under public international law a conflict exists in the 
narrow situation of mutually exclusive obligations for provisions that cover the same 
type of subject matter”81.  
 
Both Paulwelyn and Sadat-Akhavi distinguish between the existence of real and false 
conflicts. To distinguish a real conflict from a false conflict the method of interpretation 
of treaty norms82 and the reconciliation test as proposed by Sadat-Akhavi can be 
applied83. In relation to interpretation Sadat-Akhavi states that “the vagueness of norms 
may well give the impression that there is a conflict between them, but upon 
interpretation they may prove not to be conflicting”84. Wolfrum and Matz suggest using 
treaty interpretation as a means of harmonising treaties.  
“If two treaties can be brought into harmony by an interpretation that coordinates their 
contents, those mechanisms that establish the priority of one of the treaties, e.g. lex 
posterior rule, do not have to be invoked. The rules of interpretation as codified by the 
Vienna Convention form the basis of the harmonising approach to the interpretation of 
international agreements”85.  
 
The process of reconciliation is that of “trying to prove the compatibility of two 
norms”86. Sadat-Akhavi proposes a test for reconciliation as follows: “Two norms are 
reconcilable when there is at least one way of complying with all their requirements”87.  
 
79 Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (WT/DS54), (WT/DS59), (WT/DS64) 
(02 July 1998) 
80 Pauwelyn at 193 
81 Indonesia- Autos at para 14.99 in Pauwelyn at 193 
82 See Pauwelyn at 245 and Sadat-Akhavi at 25  
83 Sadat-Akhavi at 25 
84 Sadat-Akhavi at 25 
85 Wolfrum & Matz at 133 
86 Sadat-Akhavi at 34 
87 Ibid 
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By attempting to interpret the two norms or reconciling them, an apparent conflict may 
be resolved. A real conflict, on the other hand, will not be resolved by interpretation or 
reconciliation and it will be necessary to look other methods of resolving the conflict 
such as article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 
It is clear that there is not one settled definition of “conflict”. For the purposes of this 
paper, I define “conflict” in a similar way to that of Pauwelyn. That is, a conflict may 
arise where it is impossible to implement two norms without the implementation of one 
constituting or leading to, or possibly leading to a breach of the other88. A conflict 
therefore arises where the implementation of the norms of one treaty mean that the 
norms or objectives of another treaty are violated. It may be a potential conflict exists 
between two treaties, however, if through methods such as interpretation the two treaties 
can be harmonised then a real conflict is avoided. 
 
Many authors have distinguished between real and false conflicts, however, I prefer to 
think of them as potential and real in the sense that potential conflicts are a conflict but it 
is easily remedied through the interpretation of the provisions. To determine if a real 
conflict exists between the two norms it is first necessary to look to the treaties and 
determine if a conflict clause within the treaties may apply. Further a real conflict may 
be avoided through interpretation or reconciliation. A real conflict will arise only if 
interpreting techniques or reconciliation does not resolve the potential conflict. If a real 
conflict exists then conflict resolving techniques become necessary. For example it 
would be necessary to look to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention to see which treaty 
takes precedence and/or more seriously require amendment to the treaties to remedy the 
conflict.  
 
88 Pauwelyn at 176 
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3 Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights, Technology 
Transfer and Biodiversity 
 
IPRs, TT and biodiversity are interrelated. IPRs provide private property rights to the 
holders/inventors of technology (including biotechnology and EST) while technology 
and the transfer of same is an important method of conserving and sustainably using 
biodiversity. The CBD contains provisions relating to IPRs in the form of requiring 
parties to provide access and/or the transfer of technology which relates to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Further the transfer of technology may 
be considered as a benefit which maybe transferred in return for access to genetic 
resources. The CBD “requires member states to pass legislation and make policy 
decisions requiring a biotech innovator to transfer a portion of the benefits and 
technology derived from genetic resources to the resource provider country”89. This 
requirement therefore necessarily brings in the issue of IPRs and the application of 
TRIPS.  
 
The CBD and TRIPS have possibly conflicting areas.  
“An essential tenet of TRIPS is … that intellectual property consists of private rights. 
On the other hand, one of the basic principles of the CBD is that states have sovereign 
rights over their natural resources, thus subordinating private rights, such as intellectual 
property rights, to the public objectives of the agreement (CBD Preamble). As a result, 
there is much debate on the existence of an intrinsic conflict between the objectives of 
CBD and the objectives of TRIPS”90. 
 
 
89 Power at 118 
90 Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. At 308 
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Khor and many other authors consider that there are several ways in which strong IPRs 
can hinder access and transfer of technology to developing countries91. However, it is 
difficult to assess the many impacts of IPRs on biodiversity92.  Munari has pointed out 
that:  
“for many environmentalists, TRIPS is seen as one of the enemies of EST ( and 
biotechnology) transfer: not only are patents largely owned by firms in industrialised 
countries, but their superior technological skills put them at a competitive advantage vis-
à-vis (firms of) developing countries in respect of the patentability of new technology. 
This is particularly true of “biotechnologies”: these are patents developed through 
prospecting activities in the developing countries using knowledge or genetic resources, 
which were generally available at no cost to the local population. When these knowledge 
or resources are patented, then their use by the local population may be restricted”93.  
 
Some of the impacts of IPRs on TT include the following94: Firstly IPRs generally 
increase the price of technology which could put such technology out of the reach of 
developing countries which generally do not have the resources available to pay for such 
technology. This also stifles the innovation of the developing country as it does not have 
access to the technology to work from. Secondly, the IPR holder has the right to deny a 
developing country access to the technology or impose onerous conditions which makes 
it difficult for the developing country to make use of the technology. Thirdly the use of 
IPRs can restrict farmers who traditionally have “innovated on seeds through re-use, 
exchange with other farmers and other means”95. IPR regimes discourage particularly 
the exchange of seeds where the IPR holder does not obtain any compensation for the 
use of their seeds by a third party. “Farmers may also be forced to adopt the 
homogenous and genetically narrow base of modern agriculture, and be unable to further 
improve for their own purposes even the seeds or livestock they buy”96. This restriction 
 
91 See Khor at 90 and Munari in Franscioni at 171 
92 Kothari & Anurdaha , 1999, at 5 
93 Munari in Franscioni at 171 
94 Khor at 90 and Kothari & Anurdaha (1999) at 5 
95 Kothuri & Anuradha (1999) at 5 
96 Kothari & Anuradha (1997) at 5 
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on farmers would increase the economic burden on them and could also cause a loss of 
biodiversity.  
 
In a strict legal sense IPRs could hinder the transfer of technology through the strict 
enforcement of exclusive rights granted to IPR holders. In a strong IPR system, a right 
holder may be able to abuse their exclusive rights and the monopoly which they have by 
refusing to transfer technology, demanding high prices and/or imposing onerous 
conditions for the transfer of their invention.  
 
As a hypothetical example of when IPRs may hinder the transfer of technology, let us 
imagine that an American farming company, using the properties of a plant found in the 
Sahara, has come up with the technology to extract clean water straight from the air even 
in times of drought97. The American company is granted a patent over the invention. 
Such an invention would be extremely useful to many drought stricken countries 
including the country from which the American company took the plant which provided 
the basis for the invention. As the American company owns the patent it has the 
exclusive rights to provide the technology to third parties including determining the 
terms on which it may provide the technology and the price it may charge for such. A 
developing country which would like the technology is not able to obtain it due to the 
fact that the price of the invention is out of its reach and further the terms upon which 
the American company is willing to sell the technology are demanding and unfavourable 
to the developing country. In addition, if the State or the people of the developing 
country were to use the invention without permission of the American company they 
would be subject to penalties.  
 
Khor provides an example of the impact on IPRs on TT in a case study of the Montreal 
Protocol. TT is necessary for the parties to carry out their obligations under the 
protocol98. A study on the effects of IPRs concluded that 
 
97 Whether such an invention already exists (or is actually possible), I am not sure, however, it just a 
hypothetical situation. 
98 Article 10, Montreal Protocol provides for TT. 
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“efforts at acquiring substitute technology have not been successful as the technologies 
are covered by IPRs and are inaccessible either on account of high prices…and/or due to 
the conditions laid down by the suppliers. This would require domestically owned firms 
to give up their majority equity holding through joint ventures or to agree to export 
restrictions in order to gain access to the alternative technology”99.  
In this case it was found that there were only a few companies that had the patent rights 
and trade secrets over alternatives to CFCs which meant that those companies were able 
to demand high prices or make demanding conditions100.   
 
A similar situation could arise in relation to implementing the CBD. In order to achieve 
the objectives of the CBD , it is important that contracting parties have access to and/or 
the transfer of technology101. IPR holders may impose onerous conditions or demand 
high prices for this technology thereby inhibiting the ability of parties to fully carry out 
the goals of the CBD. However, there is a difference between the CBD and that of the 
Montreal Protocol in that developing countries have a bargaining tool under article 15 of 
the CBD which recognises that States have sovereign rights in their genetic resources 
and national governments have the authority to determine access to those resources. A 
contracting party may be able to gain access to or the transfer of technology as a benefit 
in exchange for access to its genetic resources102.  
 
 
99 Watal, Jayashree, 1998. ”The issue of technology transfer in the context of the Montreal Protocol: Case 
Study of India” in Khor at 93 
100 Khor at 93 
101 Article 16(1), CBD 
102 Although a host country has the authority to grant access (under article 15) there may still be 
difficulties in regulating access and therefore bio-piracy may still occur. To some extent article 15 has 
attempted to overcome that problem through requiring access to be granted on mutually agreed terms, 
with the prior informed consent (PIC) and the full participation of the host country. Although PIC is 
required under the CBD it is not a requirement for patentability under the TRIPS. Accordingly, a bio-
pirate is able to patent their invention in accordance with TRIPS but is violating the CBD. The solution to 
this problem remains in question. It has been proposed that the patentability provision of TRIPS (article 
27) needs to be amended.  
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There are many arguments that IPRs may hinder TT, however, it must be borne in mind 
that there are both negative and positive impacts of IPRs on TT. As pointed out by 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder:  
“Intellectual Property may act as an economic incentive for conserving biological 
diversity. The patenting of products and processes based on information encoded in 
genetic resources has enabled the commercialisation of products developed on the basis 
of that information, including new crop and plant varieties, pharmaceuticals, herbicides 
and pesticides, as well as new biotechnological products and processes. Consequently, 
as acknowledgement of the significance of biodiversity has increased in the past 
decades, so too has its commercial value. 
…increasing pressure by commercial interests to gain intellectual property over genetic 
resources can also negatively affect the conservation of biodiversity… economic and 
commercial rights such as intellectual property rights may be inadequate to protect the 
various facets of biodiversity and its numerous stakeholders and may in some cases even 
impair appropriate protection by other means”103.  
 
Those who support strong IPRs have suggested that strong protection should in fact 
encourage TT. If the holder of the IPR feels that their rights are fully protected and there 
is little risk that their IP will be copied and/or used without their permission then they 
are more likely to transfer technology. The objective of TRIPS is in fact that IPRs 
“should contribute to … the transfer and dissemination of technology…”104.  
 
The CBD provisions on TT have attempted to address IPR issues in order to enable the 
objectives of the CBD to be achieved. However, the issue has been raised that these 
provisions could in fact be in contravention of TRIPS; or further that a developing 
country is not able to implement the provisions under the CBD without contravening the 
TRIPS.  
 
103 Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al.at 306. Biodiversity may be protected through an ecosystem approach,, 
conservation of natural habitats and/or conservation of species.  As an example nature conserves 
(protected areas) are a way of protecting an ecosystem. Biotechnology can be used to gain knowledge of 
biodiversity which can assist in conserving it. Biotechnological processes are particularly relevant to ex-
situ conservation.  
104 Article 7, TRIPS 
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3.1 Is there a Conflict between TRIPS and CBD in relation to Technology Transfer? 
 
The potential conflict that exists between the CBD and TRIPS in relation to TT arises 
between the provisions in the CBD relating to TT as a means of benefit-sharing105 and 
as a means of achieving the objectives of the CBD106 on the one hand and the 
patentability criterion107 and exclusive rights granted to a right holder under TRIPS108 
on the other. According to Curci “the CBD is far more favourable to conservation of 
biodiversity and preservation of rights for developing countries while TRIPS is far more 
aggressive about facilitating biological patentability and promoting private ownership 
and exploitation of such resources. Nevertheless, the two aims are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive”109. 
 there is no conflict 
ut a conflict may arise in the implementation of the two treaties. 
 the 
 CBD, including those relating to … benefit sharing 
ncluding TT) are respected”110. 
inventions that use genetic material does not prevent compliance with provisions of the 
                                                
 
There are three main views expressed by States as discussed in the WTO as to whether 
or not there is a conflict between TRIPS and the CBD: that there is an inherent conflict, 
that there is no conflict and no potential for conflict and lastly that
b
 
The states that argue there is a conflict (in relation to TT) base their conclusion upon
fact that TRIPS provides for “patenting and other IPRs of genetic material without 
ensuring that the provisions of the
(i
 
The States which argue there is no conflict argue that “the granting of patent rights over 
 
105 Article 15(7), CBD 
106 Article 16, CBD 
107 Article 27, TRIPS 
108 Article 28, TRIPS. 
109 Curci, 2005, at 4 
110 Kenya, IP/CM/28, para 144 in WTO Secretariat, Summary, at 2  
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CBD regarding the sovereign right of countries over their genetic resources, … and 
benefit sharing”111. 
 
The Third view expressed by states is that there is no inherent conflict but a conflict may 
arise when the two treaties are implemented. “…there is interaction and overlap between 
the subject-matter of the two agreements”112 and “what is more important than 
considering whether there is a potential conflict is to consider how TRIPS could be 
implemented in a way supportive of the CBD”113. 
 
Paulwelyn considers that certain pre-conditions must exist for a potential conflict to 
arise. Firstly, there must be an overlap of the subject matter of the two norms. Secondly, 
the conflict must arise from the perspective of one state in its relationship with another 
State. Article 15 and 16 of the CBD relate to IPRs in terms of technology to be 
transferred which might be subject to IPRs. TRIPS clearly is about IPRs. There is, 
therefore, overlap in the subject matter. If a state which is a contracting party to both the 
CBD and TRIPS implements the TT provisions of the CBD and consequently another 
State (which is also a party to the TRIPS) is forced to provide TT as a form of benefit 
sharing in exchange for access to genetic resources, a conflict may arise. In a slightly 
different scenario, a State may choose not to implement the provisions of the CBD 
stating that TRIPS does not allow them to do so.  
 
Given that these pre-conditions are fulfilled there is a possibility that a conflict may 
arise, but is the conflict just potential or is it real? A conflict will arise where it is 
impossible to implement two norms without the implementation of one constituting or 
leading to, or possibly leading to a breach of the other. 
 
The CBD provisions in relation to TT are found at article 16 and in article 15(7) in 
relation to benefit sharing. Article 16 provides that each contracting party undertakes  
 
111 EC, IP/C/W/254, IP/C/M/30 at para 143 in WTO Secretariat, Summary at 3 
112 Australia, IP/C/W/310, Czech Republic, IP/C/M/33, para 126, Norway, IP/C/M/32, para 125 in WTO 
Secretariat, Summary at 3 
113 Brazil IP/C/M/29 at paras 146 and 148, India IP/C/M? 30 at para 169 in WTO, Secretariat, at 3 
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“to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other contracting parties of 
technologies that are relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity or make use of genetic resources…”114.  
The section goes on to provide that such transfer of technology to developing countries 
shall be provided on fair and favourable terms and in the case of technology subject to 
patents or other IPRs, the transfer shall be provided on terms which recognise and are 
consistent with adequate and effective protection of IPR115. Article 16(5) further 
provides that  
“the contracting parties, recognising that patents and other intellectual property rights 
may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall cooperate in this 
regard subject to national legislation and international law in order to ensure that such 
rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives”.  
 
Article 15(7) provides that  
“Each contracting party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, and in accordance with articles 16….. with the aim of sharing in a fair and 
equitable way the results of research and development and the benefits arising from the 
commercial and other utilisation of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms”.  
TT can be considered to be a benefit as part of the benefit sharing provision.  
 
The provisions of TRIPS which may conflict with the implementation of the above 
mentioned CBD provisions are articles 27 and 28. Article 27 relates to the patentability 
of products and/or processes and in basic terms states that all inventions shall be 
patentable provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application. Article 28 provides a patent with exclusive rights including to prevent third 
parties not having the owner’s consent from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing the product or process (or the product resulting from a protected process)116.  
 
114 Article 16(1), CBD   
115 Article 16(2), CBD 
116 Article 28(1)(a) and (b), TRIPS.  
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Patent owners also have the right to “assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and to 
conclude license contracts”117.  
 
TT is integral to achieving the objectives of the CBD, both as a means to of conserving 
and sustainably using biodiversity and as a means of benefit sharing118.   The potential 
conflict arises where a State intends to implement the TT provisions (or benefit sharing) 
of the CBD while respecting the exclusive rights of IPR holders under TRIPS. If a State 
is to achieve the objectives of the CBD, it requires TT, however it is difficult for the 
State (especially developing States) to obtain such technology while strictly affecting the 
rights of an IPR holder granted by TRIPS.  
 
The exclusive rights may make it difficult for the State to obtain TT and consequently 
such rights run counter to the objectives of the CBD as outlined in article 16(5), creating 
a potential conflict with TRIPS. Further under article 15 of the CBD a contracting party 
must obtain a benefit (perhaps in the form of TT) in exchange for it granting access to its 
genetic resources. This could be enforced by refusing to patent a process or product if 
the applicant does not show evidence of benefit sharing for the use of the genetic 
resource. However, it is not a requirement of patentability under article 27 of TRIPS that 
a patent applicant show they have entered into benefit sharing with the providing 
country.  If a State implements such a requirement, it could be in violation of TRIPS as 
it extends the requirements for patentability beyond that stated in TRIPS.   
 
Kruger points out that there is potential for conflicting results in implementation;  
“Without reconciliation, they (the CBD and TRIPS) can produce quite different results – 
one allowing a country to protect itself against bio-piracy of foreign states and one 
forcing a state to recognise intellectual property rights which may not be beneficial to 
the preservation of the biodiversity of that State”119. 
 
 
117 Article 28(2), TRIPS 
118 see Article 1, CBD 
119 Kruger at paragraphs 188-189 
  32 
                                                
The provisions of TRIPS and the CBD may be in conflict when it comes to attempting to 
implement both conventions. However, it may be possible to avoid a real conflict 
through interpretation or reconciliation. Maljean-Dubois is of the opinion that the 
conflict between TRIPS and CBD is an “apparent conflict” only120. He considers that 
harmonisation “can be realised through adequate interpretation of all the obligations at 
stake and further legislative work, harmonising the two treaties for the benefit of the 
international community”121. 
 
If interpretation or reconciliation does not lead to the possibility of implementing both 
norms without being in conflict then a real conflict exists. If such a situation arises then 
conflict resolving techniques such as that set out in article 30 of the Vienna Convention 
must be considered.  
 
3.1.1 Conflict Clause within the CBD 
 
Occasionally a treaty will contain a conflict clause which provides for ways to avoid 
conflicts with other norms. This provision is the first place to look in attempting to 
resolve a conflict. The CBD at section 22(1) refers to its relationship with other 
agreements stating  
“The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the 
exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity”.  
 
There are two parts to the conflict clause, firstly the CBD will not effect another existing 
treaty (that is existing at the time the CBD entered into force) and secondly, another 
treaty will be affected by the CBD where the exercise of the rights and obligations under 
the other treaty would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.   
 
 
120 Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, Biodiversite, Biotechnologies, Biosecurite: Le Droit International 
Desarticule, 127(4) J. Du Droit Int’L 966-967 (2000) in Curci, 2005, at 15  
121 Curci , 2005, at 15  
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It is uncertain how this provision relates to TRIPS122. TRIPS entered into force in 1995. 
The CBD entered into force in 1993. Accordingly TRIPS was not an “existing” 
international agreement at the time the CBD entered into force. Therefore the conflict 
clause does not apply in attempting to resolve the conflict with TRIPS. It is of course 
also possible to say though that the TRIPS is now an existing international agreement in 
that it is now in existence. 
 
The second part of the clause has caused some difficulty in application as “…there are 
no criteria as to when the exercise of rights and obligations poses a serious threat to 
biological diversity”123. The “effectiveness of the provision depends upon the 
interpretation of ‘serious damage or threat to biological diversity’”124. TRIPS could pose 
a threat to biological diversity through allowing the patenting of plant varieties which 
could lead to mono-cultures. A particular example is the terminator seed which requires 
a chemical trigger in order to allow the resulting plant to reproduce. In this way 
overriding the provisions of the CBD in favour of TRIPS could cause “serious damage 
or threat to biological diversity”.   
 
TRIPS contains no provisions relating to the situation of conflict with environmental 
agreements. Without any guidance within the texts on how to resolve a possible conflict, 
then interpretation or reconciliation may be considered to avoid the conflict.  
 
122 COP 3 paper at para 40 
123 Wolfrum & Matz at 125 
124 Kothari & Anuradha, 1997 at 13  
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3.1.2 Interpretation  
 
The interpretation of treaties is governed by articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna 
Convention125. Article 31 provides the general rule(s) of interpretation. A treaty must be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context126. The context of a treaty includes its text, the 
preamble and annexes and any other agreements made between the parties relating to the 
treaty127. Further, when interpreting a treaty account can be taken of any subsequent 
agreements between the parties, any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
and any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties128.  If a treaty 
provision’s ordinary meaning is clear then applying other rules of interpretation will not 
be necessary. Pauwelyn has pointed out that a provision must be "broad and ambiguous 
enough to allow for input by other rules”129.Further, in the example of WTO rules “the 
other rule must say something about what the WTO term should mean, that is there must 
be a hook- up with the WTO term for the other rule to impart meaning in the process of 
interpretation”130.  
 
 
125 The Vienna Convention is considered to be a customary rule of treaty interpretation and accordingly is 
applicable to the interpretation of the CBD regardless of whether the members of the CBD have ratified 
the Vienna Convention. Under article 3.2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules of Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes customary rules of interpretation shall be used to clarify the provisions of the 
agreements. The WTO also considers the Vienna Convention to be customary rules of treaty interpretation 
and applicable in WTO dispute resolution, see US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, Report of the Appellate Body (29 Apr 1996) (WT/DS2/AB/R)   
126 Article 31(1), Vienna Convention 
127 Article 31(2), Vienna Convention 
128 Article 31(3), Vienna Convention 
129 Pauwelyn at 245 
130 Pauwelyn at 245  
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3.1.2.1 Ordinary Meaning and Context - Article 31(1) and (2) Vienna 
Convention  
 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention has been interpreted by the WTO panel and 
Appellate Body “…to require an investigation into both the natural language 
construction of the wording and then the purpose which the rules were designed to 
fulfil”131. Pauwelyn following the opinion of the International Law Commission opines 
that effectiveness (that is fulfilling the purpose of the treaty) could in fact be 
incorporated into article 31(1) as article 31(1) requires that a treaty be interpreted in 
good faith132. Therefore “when a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does 
and the other does not enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the 
objects and purposes of the treaty demand that the former interpretation should be 
adopted”133.  
 
The two articles in contention in TRIPS are article 27 on the issue of patentability and 
article 28 relating to the exclusive rights of the patent owner. These two articles must be 
interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning in context in a manner which 
gives effect to the purpose of TRIPS.   
 
The objective of TRIPS is to provide “..protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights which should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation 
and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”134. Further TRIPS 
must be read in light of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. The preamble 
to the Marrakesh provides that the parties to the agreement recognise  
 
131 Smith and Woods at 40 citing examples of Mexico- Measures affecting Telecommunications Services, 
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004) and US- Reformulated Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29,1996). 
132 Pauwelyn at 248 
133 ICJ Reports 1950, 229 in Pauwelyn at 248 
134 Article 7, TRIPS 
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“that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted 
with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the 
production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the 
world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, both 
seeking to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so 
in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of 
economic development” (emphasis added).  
 
Article 27(1) provides that patent protection must be provided to all inventions that are 
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. This provision 
has been interpreted to mean that the invention must not have existed or been used 
before (that is, it is new); it is the result of innovation and not simply a discovery (for 
example a genetic resource in its natural state is simply a discovery and would therefore 
not qualify for patenting); and lastly it must have some use for the industry the invention 
was designed for135.  
 
Under article 27(2) members may exclude certain inventions from patentability which is 
necessary to protect ordre public and morality including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serous prejudice to the environment. Further exclusions 
are listed under article 27(3) including that members may exclude from patentability 
plants and animals other than micro-organisms. However, members must provide 
protection for plant varieties either by patent or a sui generic system.  
 
In its ordinary meaning Article 27 does not require a patent applicant to show that they 
have engaged in benefit sharing with the source country (in the case where genetic 
resources are the basis of the invention). This in some ways runs contradictory to the 
procedures of the CBD which does require each contracting party to take measures to 
ensure the sharing of the benefits resulting from the use of genetic resources of the host 
country. Further the aims of the CBD are weakened by the non-requirement of TRIPS to 
 
135 De Cluitt at 2 
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show benefit sharing. Perhaps there is some argument in stating that in order to carry out 
the objectives of TRIPS and the Marrakesh agreement, i.e. to contribute to TT (which is 
a benefit under article 15, CBD) while optimally using the world’s resources with the 
objective of sustainable development, such a disclosure is required. This would require 
the interpretation of new, inventive step or industrial application to mean that benefit 
sharing has been entered into. Given the quite clear wording of those terms and the 
interpretation given to them already, it would be quite a stretch to make such an 
argument. Perhaps a better argument to be made under article 27(2).  
 
A member may have the option under article 27(2) to deny a patent if it can be shown 
that such a step is necessary to avoid serious prejudice to the environment. Prejudice in 
its ordinary meaning means a negative impact upon something. In light of the objectives 
of the Marrakesh agreement an invention may have a negative impact on the 
environment if it contributes to decreasing biodiversity. There is argument that the 
patenting of biotechnology could have a negative impact on biodiversity especially 
where it allows for bio-piracy136 and/or the invention is damaging to the environment 
such as in the case of the terminator seed. Although this assists in carrying out the 
objectives of the CBD in sustainably using and/or conserving biodiversity, it does not 
assist in ensuring that the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources are shared in 
an equitable manner.   
 
There still remains, therefore, the potential for conflict in relation to implementing 
article 15 of the CBD requiring benefit sharing. A State is arguably free to implement a 
further requirement to patentability that an applicant must that an applicant must show 
that they have entered into benefit sharing where an invention is the result of 
biotechnology137.  There is argument that such a provision would violate article 27(1) 
which requires that patentability be provided without discrimination as to the field of 
technology. However, this may be justified under the exception in article 8 to protect 
public interest (discussed below).  
 
136 Where the taking of genetic resources is not monitored and protected this could lead to the destruction 
of that resource. 
137 This is possible as TRIPS only provides the minimum requirements for patentability. 
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Article 28 provides the patent holder with certain exclusive rights. Again, the wording of 
the provision is quite clear. However, looking to the context of these rights, they are not 
without exceptions. Articles 8, 30 and 31 all provide for exceptions to the rights 
conferred on the right holder. Khor suggests that using the flexibilities provided by these 
articles could provide a way to potentially overcome the conflict 138.  
 
It is unclear, however, how these exceptions may be implemented. For example Article 
30 is quite ambiguous providing that “members may provide limited exceptions to the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties”. What are the limited exceptions a member may provide?  
Article 30 can be interpreted taking into account its context with article 8 providing 
some assistance. Article 8 states that “members may …adopt measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this agreement”.  Therefore the limited 
exceptions allowable under article 30 may include measures to protect the public 
interest. It is unclear as to what constitutes “public interest”.  
 
Article 31 states that members may provide laws which allow for the use of the patent 
without the patent holders permission provided that pre-requisites are carried out139. 
According to Khor on the basis of this provision it is “legitimate to formulate in 
domestic law a system that grants compulsory licences for reasons such as: (a) those set 
out in article 8…; (b) where a licence is unreasonably refused to a local firm; (c) where 
other anti-competitive practices by the patent holders are identified”140. Accordingly, 
where an IPR holder is demanding high prices and/or onerous conditions for the transfer 
 
138 Khor at 64  
139 At Article 31(a) to (l). 
140 Nijar, G.S, 1996. “TRIPS and Biodiversity: the threat and responses”, Penang, Third World Network in 
Khor at 65-66. 
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of their technology which is important to the sustainable use or conservation of 
biodiversity, a State may be able to issue a compulsory licence to obtain the technology. 
Such use may be justified under article 8 and possibly under article 7 in achieving the 
objective of TT. It is clear from the TRIPS provisions overall that taking advantage of 
this provision may only be done so in limited circumstances and under certain 
conditions which are “aimed at protecting the legitimate interests of the patent 
holder”141. The use of a compulsory licence granted under this article may be done so in 
the circumstances described in article 8. Again the question arises as to what is meant by 
“public interest”? 
 
Where the ordinary meaning and the context do not provide any guidance then 
assistance may be sort from other relevant rules of international law applicable between 
the parties142. 
 
3.1.2.2 Other matters to consider in Addition to the Context – Article 31(3)(c) 
Vienna Convention 
 
In interpreting a norm of a treaty, it is possible to look to other matters in addition to the 
ordinary meaning and context. Article 31(3)(c) provides that any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties may be used in 
interpreting the norm. According to Sands “article 31(3)(c) reflects a “principle of 
integration. It emphasises both the “unity of international law” and the sense in which 
rules should not be considered in isolation of general international law”143.  The extent 
that other rules of public international law including other treaty law, general principles 
and customary law apply to the WTO treaties which are often referred to as “self-
contained” is questionable. However, the Appellate body itself has recognised that the 
 
141 WTO Press Release, ”Decision Removes final obstacle to cheap drug imports” 30 August 2003 
available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm (30/06/06) 
142 Article 31(3)(c), Vienna Convention 
143 Sands at 95 
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WTO system is not a completely closed system and the WTO agreements should not be 
read “in clinical isolation from public international law”144.   
  
Questions arise in relation to firstly what type of international rules can be considered, 
secondly what is meant by “rules applicable in the relations between the parties”, that is, 
which parties do the rules have to be applicable to and lastly “what is meant by relevant 
rules”145? The reference to “international rules” has been considered to refer to all 
sources of international law including customary law, general principles and other treaty 
laws146. It is uncertain as to which parties the provision is referring to. In a recent WTO 
panel decision the expression “party” requires that “all the parties to the treaty to be 
interpreted needed to have become parties to that other treaty”147. Therefore, it is 
necessary that all the parties to TRIPS are also parties to the CBD. In relation to the 
meaning of “relevant” rules, it has been said that if the “other rule sheds light on the 
meaning of the WTO term, it is relevant. If it has no bearing on it, then it is not 
relevant”148. 
 
The WTO Appellate Body has looked to other sources of international law when 
interpreting provisions of its agreements. In the case of United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products149, the Appellate Body was called 
upon to interpret the meaning of ‘exhaustible natural resources’. The Appellate Body 
noted: “the words of Article XX(g)... must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of 
contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and 
 
144 Koskenniemi at 73. Further the DSU at article 3(2) provides that customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law apply to the WTO dispute settlement bodies. Sands is also of the view that other 
rules of international law should apply to the WTO “unless it can be shown that such an application would 
undermine the object and purpose of the WTO” (Sands at 104) 
145 Pauwelyn at 254 
146 Koskenniemi at 180. This has been supported by various judicial bodies, for example, the WTO in the 
US -Shrimp Case, Appellate Body Report, para 130 and the European Court of Human Rights in  Loizidou 
v Turkey, judgement of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, para 44 in Pauwelyn at 256 
147 EC- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (7 February 2006) 
WT/DS291-293/INTERIM, p. 299 para 7.68 in Koskenniemi at 190 
148 Pauwelyn at 263-264 
149 1998 
  41 
                                                
conservation of the environment”150.  The Appellate Body also made reference to the 
preamble of the WTO Agreement which indicates “the parties’ awareness of the 
‘importance and legitimacy of environmental protection’ and ‘explicitly acknowledges 
“the objective of sustainable development”151. On the basis of this reasoning the WTO 
referred to the CBD among other treaty instruments to interpret “exhaustible natural 
resources”152. However, as Pauwelyn points out the Appellate Body did not make 
reference to article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention when interpreting the term 
“exhaustible resources” and accordingly it “remains unclear whether these references to 
non-WTO treaties were made pursuant to Art. 31(3)(c) or for example, pursuant to art 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention, calling for an interpretation of treaties ‘in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty”. The 
Appellate Body in its reasoning specifically stated that “We hold that, in line with the 
principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation, measures to conserve exhaustible 
natural resources… may fall within Article XX(g)”153.Even so, this is a positive 
indication that the WTO is willing to take into consideration other treaty provisions in 
order to interpret a WTO treaty.  
 
It is possible to take account of the CBD provisions when interpreting TRIPS. It is 
questionable as to whether it is necessary that every member to TRIPS has also ratified 
the CBD for it to be taken into account. On the basis of the EC-Biochemical Products 
case it seems that it is necessary. However, “it aims to mitigate this (limiting affect)…by 
accepting that other treaties may nevertheless be taken into account as facts elucidating 
the ordinary meaning of certain terms in the relevant WTO Treaty”154.  There is some 
support for the fact that the parties may not need to be parties to the agreement if the 
agreement is considered to reflect the “trends followed by international law”155.  
 
 
150 Shrimp Turtle Case at para 129 in French at 297 
151 Shrimp-Turtle case at para 130 in French at 297 
152 Pauwelyn at 256 
153 Shrimp-Turtle at at para 131 in French at 298 
154 Koskenniemi at 191 
155 Opinion of Judge Treves in Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v Japan, Australia v Japan), 
Provisional Measures (1999) in French at 311 
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The question arises if an exception to the rights of an IP holder to facilitate the transfer 
of technology for the purposes of the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable 
use of biodiversity under the CBD could be considered as a measure to protect public 
health/ nutrition or to promote the “public interest” as allowable under the exceptions in 
article 8 TRIPS? Kothari & Anuradha have noted that “although environmental 
protection is not explicitly incorporated into this provision, it could be construed as an 
important aspect of the ‘public interest’”156.  
 
It is noted in the preamble to the CBD that biodiversity is a common concern of human 
kind and is important to maintaining life sustaining systems of the biosphere. Further it 
is recognised that “the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity is of 
critical importance for meeting the food, health and other needs of the growing world 
population, for which purpose access to and sharing of both genetic resources and 
technologies are essential”. The preamble to the WTO Agreement expressly provides 
that sustainable development is an aim of the WTO. Sustainable development and 
particularly the conservation of biodiversity has been considered a vital mechanism for 
preventing food shortages, something which could be considered important for 
protecting public health and nutrition. Further article 7 of TRIPS expressly states that its 
objectives are to protect IPR in order to promote the transfer of technology.     
 
Taking these matters into account when interpreting article 8, measures to protect public 
health and nutrition and the public interest could include legislating for the transfer of 
technology in return for access to genetic resources. There is argument that providing for 
benefit sharing in exchange for access to a State’s genetic resources is vital for its 
economic growth; if a party exploits those genetic resources and patents the results, then 
it takes the opportunity away from the host country to exploit them for itself. Therefore, 
it is in the public interest that benefit sharing be included as a pre-requisite for 
patentability.  
 
Further, the sustainable use and protection of biodiversity is seen as a mechanism to 
ensure sustainable development and as a means of preventing food shortages. Preventing 
 
156 Kothari & Anuradha at 7-8 
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food shortages is a way of protecting public health and nutrition.  In order to protect the 
public health a State may implement exceptions to the rights of IPR holders to compel 
the transfer of technology. Taking the example of the water extracting machine patented 
to the American Company, an African country may issue a compulsory licence for the 
use of the machine in order to prevent its people from starving due to drought.  
 
Article 30 also provides for exceptions to the right holders’ rights. Its terms are quite 
ambiguous and can be interpreted in light of article 8 of the TRIPS.  To date the WTO 
dispute settlement bodies have interpreted article 30 quite narrowly. An example of this 
is the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case157 where the EC challenged Canadian laws 
that created exceptions to the exclusive rights of patent holders. The panel stated that 
article 30 consists of three parts which all must be fulfilled to allow the exceptions: (1) 
the exception must be “limited”; (2) it cannot unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation of the patent; and (3) it cannot ‘unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties”158.  The panel concluded that “to determine whether a particular exception 
constitutes a limited exception, the extent to which the patent owner's rights have been 
curtailed must be measured”159.  It concluded that “a normal exploitation” of the patent 
referred to commercial activity and further for a measure to conflict with the normal 
exploitation it must “exclude all forms of competition that could detract significantly 
from the economic returns anticipated from a patent's grant of market exclusivity”160.  
Thirdly the panel found that the “legitimate interests” (of a patent holder) referred to 
“widely recognized normative standard(s)”161. The panel did not consider the meaning 
of ‘taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties’. Although the panel in its 
opening statements mentioned that article 30 was to be interpreted in light of the object 
and purpose, that is articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, it did not refer to these provisions in its 
substantial reasoning162.  
 
157 Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (19 December 1997) DS114  
158 Canada – Pharmaceutical case at para 7.20 
159 Ibid at para 7.32 
160 Ibid at para 7.55 and 7.54 
161 Ibid at para 7.80 
162 Bersconi-Osterwalder et al. at 313 
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It may be possible to argue that this case should be disregarded for its failure to take into 
account articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS.  Since this decision, the Doha Declaration of 2001 
which relates to the use of patented pharmaceuticals in times of health crises, states that 
the objectives and principles of TRIPS should be considered in the interpretation of the 
TRIPS163. Accordingly, a decision made today in relation to interpreting article 30 may 
differ slightly when taking account of articles 7 and 8.   
 
Given the importance of conserving biodiversity and the role that that plays in 
sustainable development and further that biodiversity protection and the sustainable use 
of same may be considered as public interests; it is conceivable that a State may utilise 
create exceptions to exclusive rights under article 30 for an invention which is necessary 
for conserving or sustainably using biodiversity. Such an exception must be limited for 
example the exception is only utilised for a small period of time and must not conflict 
with the normal exploitation of the invention. This may be justified if the invention is to 
be used only in that particular State for the purposes of protecting its people. The patent 
holder may then exploit the invention in other countries and thereby may normally 
exploit the invention.    
 
Due to the narrow interpretation of article 30, there may be some difficulties in 
implementing it. Accordingly it may be possible to take advantage of the exception in 
article 31 instead. A State may be able to authorise the use of patented technology 
without the consent of the right holder in the circumstances that such patented 
technology is in the public interest (as we have concluded public interest to include 
conserving and sustainably using biodiversity under article 8). Provided that the grounds 
in article 31 are complied with it may be possible to take advantage of this section to 
fulfil the obligations under the CBD.  
 
 It may also be possible to interpret the exceptions within TRIPS in light of other 
customary laws and general principles of international law. These may include human 
 
163WTO, “The Separate Doha Declaration Explained” 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/healthdeclexpln_e.htm (02/07/06) 
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rights norms such as the right to food. It is recognised that the conservation and further 
the sustainable use of biodiversity can assist in alleviating the food shortage problem 
occurring in the world today. Certain technologies assist particularly with the sustainable 
use of biodiversity which may lead to the increase in crop variety and crop resistance to 
pests which leads to greater production of food. Perhaps the interpretation of protecting 
public health and nutrition and public interest could include the right to food. Therefore 
if a State were to use the exceptions within TRIPS to compulsory licence (for example) 
a technology for the purpose of sustainable use of biodiversity, it could be argued that 
this is in line with protecting public health and nutrition and accordingly allowed under 
TRIPS. As the IPR Commission has stated “… there are no circumstances in which the 
most fundamental human rights (such as the right to food) should be subordinated to the 
requirements of IP protection”164.  
 
3.1.3 Conclusion on Interpretation 
 
Although a potential conflict exists between the provisions of the CBD and TRIPS, it is 
possible to avoid a “real” conflict through interpreting the provisions. Of particular 
importance is the interpretation of the exceptions available in TRIPS. If these provisions 
are interpreted in light of the CBD and other customary laws or general principles of 
international law including for example human rights norms, it may be possible to 
implement both treaties in a mutually supportive manner without encountering a real 
conflict.    
 
Until a decision is made by a court or the WTO dispute settlement body it is difficult to 
say with any certainty that the provisions will be interpreted in the manner suggested.  
 
In addition to interpreting the provisions, the process of reconciliation may be another 
method of avoiding a real conflict.    
 
 
164 IPR Commission at 3 
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3.1.4 Reconciliation 
Reconciliation as proposed by Sadat-Akhavi is a process of “trying to prove the 
compatibility of two norms”165. He proposes a test for this as follows: “Two norms are 
reconcilable when there is at least one way of complying with all their requirements”166. 
Sadat-Akhavi outlines three situations involving reconcilable norms which commonly 
occur167. One of those situations is the situation where “one norm relate(s) to the 
‘manner’ in which the other norm must be performed…. The norms remain compatible 
so long as one norm leaves available at least one manner in which the other norm can be 
respected”168.  
 
In this sense of reconciliation we are referring to designing the provision when 
implementing it into domestic law in such a manner that it does not conflict with the 
other Treaty. We are not referring to the more traditional sense of reconciliation by 
means of for example applying lex posterior and lex specialis. The provisions must be 
flexible enough to allow for at least one way to implement both provisions without 
violating the other.  
 
The CBD provisions require States to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to 
other contracting parties of technology in order to conserve biodiversity. TRIPS requires 
that States provide right holders with exclusive rights meaning that the right holder has 
the right to decide if they will sell or licence (for example) their technology. There are 
limited exceptions in TRIPS which allow for these exclusive rights to be limited.  
Therefore one norm is stating in a sense that right holders should be encouraged or 
compelled to transfer technology while the other is providing that a right holder with the 
exclusive right to decide what they wan to do with their invention.  
 
Given that no conflict will arise if there is at least one way of complying with both 
norms, it may be possible to reconcile the two provisions by the State legislating for 
 
165 Sadat-Akhavi at 34 
166 Ibid 
167 Ibid at 35 
168 Sadat-Akhavi at 41 
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agreements with the right holder which provide the State with technology in return for 
access to their genetic resources. In this way the right holder is giving up their rights of 
their own free will and therefore the exclusive rights given under TRIPS are respected. 
At the same time the State is gaining TT which fulfils the norms of the CBD.  Private 
agreements are discussed further in section 4. 
 
It is therefore possible to reconcile the two agreements as there is one way of 
implementing the provisions in a way that neither treaty is breached.  Accordingly, there 
is no “real” conflict.  
 
3.2 Conclusion on Part 2 – Is there a conflict? 
 
It is clear that a potential conflict exists between the CBD provisions on TT and the 
provisions of TRIPS relating to the exclusive rights granted to the right holder. 
However, a real conflict can be avoided through the methods of interpretation and/or 
reconciliation. Article 31(3)(c) which allows for interpretation of a norm by applying 
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties is 
of great assistance. Applying that interpretation rule it is possible to interpret the 
exceptions in TRIPS taking into account the provisions of the CBD. Further other 
customary rules including human rights norms can be considered when interpreting the 
exceptions in TRIPS. Interpreting the provisions of TRIPS in a manner consistent with 
the CBD allows for both treaties to be implemented in a manner which does not lead to a 
real conflict.    
 
Another alternative to avoid a “real” conflict is to turn to the method of reconciliation as 
proposed by Sadat-Akhavi. It is possible to reconcile the two norms of the CBD and 
TRIPS particularly through the use of private agreements which allows for compliance 
with both norms.  
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4 Ways Forward  
 
One of the most important aspects of the CBD is that States have sovereign rights over 
their genetic resources and further that they have the authority to determine access. This 
gives the State a bargaining tool to use in order to obtain TT and provides a manner in 
which States can implement the TT provisions of the CBD without violating TRIPS.  
There are two ways in which this can be done. Firstly States can enact national 
legislation taking full advantage of the exceptions within TRIPS by for example, 
allowing compulsory licences for technology which conserves or sustainably uses 
biodiversity and further legislating to provide that access to genetic resources will only 
be granted in return for TT. Secondly, States have the ability to negotiate private 
agreements under which technology is transferred in return for access to genetic 
resources.  
 
It has been pointed out that while these methods are useful, there is some difficulty in 
regulating access and therefore right holders may get around the legislation or avoid 
entering into an agreement. There is the option of taking legal action once the violation 
has been discovered and attempt to prevent the issue of a patent over the technology. 
However, it may be that a country does not have the resources to pursue the legal case or 
it does not have the resources to monitor patent offices over the globe for those 
violations169. The other problem is that TRIPS does not compel an applicant to prove 
they have entered into benefit sharing agreements and therefore the State may not have 
any grounds to prevent the patent under the provisions of TRIPS.  
 
It is acknowledged that there are still potential problems within TRIPS in relation to the 
CBD; however, this may be overcome to some extent by national legislation. The best 
 
169 See Khor at 60-61 
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way forward is for States to implement such legislation or to enter into private 
agreements with technology rights holders. 
 
4.1 Legislating to Compel Technology Transfer 
 
It is possible for States to enact legislation which implements the TT provisions of the 
CBD without conflicting with TRIPS. Such legislation could take full advantage of the 
exceptions within TRIPS to enable TT and/or benefit sharing mechanisms (including the 
transfer of technology as a benefit) to be incorporated into national legislation.  
“A country could pass legislation stating that its resources were accessible to all, 
provided that those wishing to avail themselves of these resources were willing to sign a 
legally binding agreement to not apply restrictive IPRs to these resources, or allow such 
application by third parties. In addition, appropriate benefit-sharing arrangements could 
also be worked out in Material or Information Transfer Agreements”170. 
  
When implementing the provisions of both TRIPS and the CBD States should bear in 
mind the respective objectives of both conventions.  
“Depending on the actual legislation passed by member nations and the extent of the 
rights relinquished, an erosion of intellectual property rights could actually create a 
disincentive for biotechnology companies to invest in research on, and development of, 
a given country’s genetic resources. Should this occur implementation of the 
Convention’s provisions could work against its goals. This will not necessarily be true, 
however, if the legislation is such that it does not undermine the profit potential 
available to a firm”171.  
 
According to Power it is preferable to enact legislation that allows for flexibility in 
negotiating a contract which  
“…is preferable to having developed nations pass legislation requiring companies to 
automatically relinquish certain rights. It is preferable because control is in the hands of 
the nations possessing the biogenetic resources. Given market conditions, they can 
                                                 
170 Kotharni & Anurdah at 10 
171 Power at 119 
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negotiate in order to cover the costs of foregoing the development of their tropical 
rainforests. Furthermore, compulsory licensing and the full or partial relinquishment of 
patent or other intellectual property rights is not required, but is merely a component of 
the negotiations equation”172. 
 
Power also considers that the key to the effectiveness of such legislation lies in a united 
front, that is, by many States passing similar legislation. This will prevent a potential 
investor seeking out States which do not have such requirements which would 
undermine the objectives of the CBD. “…if increasing numbers of resource provider 
countries pass similar legislation requiring compensation for native species, it will 
become the norm for companies to compensate a provider country for the utilisation of 
its natural species instead of the exception”173. 
 
A few States have already drafted legislation in relation to the CBD. Two examples are 
the regional agreement between Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, The 
Andean Pact, and the Biodiversity Law of Costa Rica. 
 
The Andean Pact has adopted the “common system on Access to Genetic Resources”174.  
“The access system sought to enable Member countries to obtain benefits from 
biotechnological products derived from their resources by facilitating technological 
training, research, development and transfers through access contracts”175.  
This access system is still in its infancy and its success or failure is yet to be seen. 
 
The biodiversity legislation of Costa Rica176 has taken advantage of some of the 
exceptions available in TRIPS in order to have access to technologies which the 
monopolisation of may cause harm to fishing and farming which is important to the 
public interest in regards to food, health and nutrition. Article 78 of that legislation 
 
172 Power at 122 
173 Ibid at 123 
174 Venrux at 11 
175 Tafur-Dominguez, Victor. “International Environmental Harmonisation – Emergence and 
Development of the Andean Community”, 12 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283, 306-307 (2000) in Venrux at 12 
176 Biodiversity Law, 1998, Costa Rica  
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provides that IPRS will not be applied to “inventions which, to be commercially 
exploited through a monopoly, can affect farming or fishing processes or products which 
are considered basic for the food and health of the inhabitants of the country”. This 
provision is allowable under the exception provided in article 27(2) of TRIPS177 and 
also article 8 for protecting the public intere
 
The Bonn Guidelines may also provide some assistance to States in legislating to enable 
benefit sharing provisions of the CBD. The aim of the Bonn Guidelines is to  
“serve as inputs when developing and drafting legislative, administrative or policy 
measures on access and benefit sharing…. And contracts and other arrangements under 
mutually agreed terms for access and benefit-sharing”178.  
 
It is possible for countries to implement the TRIPS and the CBD in a mutually 
supportive manner through legislation.  
4.2 Private Agreements to Facilitate Technology Transfer 
 
Both TRIPS and the CBD allow for private contracts between parties for the transfer of 
technologies179. According to Venrux:  “… agreements between multinational 
corporations and host countries have shown promise for facilitating the TT goals of the 
                                                 
177 Article 27(2), TRIPS allows members to exclude from patentability inventions which preventing the 
commercial exploitation of is necessary to protect ordre public or morality including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health. In this example perhaps it is protecting human health and life.   
178 Article 1, Bonn Guidelines 
179 The parties to the contract may be a private enterprise and a State acting in its public capacity or a State 
acting in a private capacity. How the State enters into the contract will have an impact on how it is 
enforced and carried out. It is questionable whether a State acting in its public capacity may be able to 
contract out of the CBD and further whether a State acting in a private capacity may contract out of the 
CBD. However, the implications of this issue are more detailed than this paper will allow. Here we are 
referring to a State acting in its public capacity.  
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CBD and TRIPS”180.  Such agreements have been referred to as “material transfer 
agreements (MTAs)” 181. 
 
The drafting of the terms of the agreement is crucial to ensure a mutually advantageous 
agreement. Every MTA should provide detailed terms for the conditions upon which 
access and use of genetic resources is granted and should provide for the transfer of 
technology and benefit sharing provisions182. It has been suggested that all MTAs: 
“…should address several key elements in an effort to further the goals of the CBD. 
These include ownership and control of genetic resources, compensation, TT and the use 
of resultant knowledge…additionally…(MTAs) should have binding provisions 
regarding licensing and royalties”183. 
 
An example of a MTA is the well-known agreement between Merck Pharmaceuticals 
and Costa Rica’s Institutio Nacional de Biodiversidad (InBio). Although the agreement 
was entered into before the CBD entered into force, it is perhaps a good model of an 
MTA. The agreement required InBio to provide samples of various genetic materials to 
Merck over a two year period. Merck paid an initial sum of money which was simply for 
the access to the resources and was to be used in “taxonomic activities, genetic resources 
conservation, scientific training, and acquiring equipment for specimen collection” 184. 
The agreement also provided for royalty payments to be made to InBio if Merck was 
able to successfully commercialise a product derived from the samples provided by 
InBio. Further Merck agreed to employ local scientists for its bio-prospecting and to 
contribute to InBio laboratory equipment and materials needed to operate the processing 
laboratory185.   
 
180 Venrux at 10 
181 Lesser, W. “Sustainable Use of Genetic Resources Under the Convention on Biological Diversity” 
(1998) in Venrux at 11 
182 Secretariat, WTO, Summary at 6 
183 Rettig at 277. Further WIPO has produced a document entitled ”Operational Principles for Intellectual 
Property Clauses of Contractual Agreements Concerning Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing” available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2001/igc/doc/grtkfic2_3.doc which 
may provide some assistance for the types of clauses necessary for an effective MTA. 
184 Venrux at 11 
185 Ibid  
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The agreement has been “hailed as a success in promoting rural economic development, 
technology transfer and the preservation of biodiversity”186. It has been said that it fully 
implements the CBD objectives in a way that does not violate TRIPS.   
“This agreement … met several objectives of both the CBD and TRIPS. First, by 
providing up-front remuneration to InBio and the Costa Rican government, the host 
country shares a stake in innovations developed out of their biological resources. 
Second, by including a provision whereby Merck would provide royalty payments for 
any future commercialised product, the host country shares in the benefits of any profits 
derived through biotechnological development. Third, the agreement facilitated 
technology transfer by employing local scientists in bio-prospecting”187. 
 
It has been noted, however, that this agreement may not be “replicated easily”188.  This 
is due to the fact that Costa Rica’s infrastructure is perhaps more advanced then most 
developing countries189 and further many developing States do not have institutions like 
that of InBio that oversees the country’s natural resources190.  However, it is possible to 
work with the agreement for it to suit the particular State as evidenced by the fact that 
further agreements in other countries have now been entered into.  
  
A further example is that between Shaman Pharmaceuticals and tribes in Peru.  
“Shaman developed a program to compensate communities that assist in identifying and 
retrieving genetic materials that could be used in developing new pharmaceuticals. This 
program paid indigenous communities royalties on any successful commercial products 
derived from their resources…. Shaman also provided short and medium term benefits 
to address the immediate needs of the indigenous community. These benefits included 
training local scientists in using new technologies, providing scientific software, and 
supplying certain biotechnological equipment”191.  
 
186 Keating at 542 
187 Venrux at 11 
188 McClelland at 2 
189 Ibid 
190 Venrux at 11 
191 Leser, w at 33-34 in Venrux at 11 
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Unfortunately this agreement did not prove to be profitable for Shaman. Similarly, at the 
conclusion of the Merck agreement “no drugs or other marketable products were 
developed from Costa Rican resources”192 and further Merck did not turn a profit. The 
failure of Shaman and Merck to make a profit has called into “question the efficacy of 
these programs as a viable business model”193. 
 
These failures highlight the fact that only very few genetic resources actually result in a 
profitable invention. This is not a reason to give up on MTAs but merely calls for the 
risk of non-profitability to be taken into account at the phase of negotiation. Power is of 
the opinion that a host country may be willing to take some of the risk of the bio-
prospecting expedition in order to achieve an agreement. She states:  
“…biotech firms may even benefit slightly in the short term from the need to negotiate 
contracts with a country providing genetic resources. Because potentially the entire 
relationship between the genetic resource provider and the firm requiring genetic 
materials would be negotiable, the biotech enterprise might be able to negotiate the 
requirement that the host nation assume a portion of the risks inherent in the research 
and development of any new biotech product or process derived from the acquired 
genetic materials.”194. 
 
Although there are still some issues that need to be resolved in negotiating such 
agreements, such as apportioning the risk for companies, there is the prospect that such 
agreements will path the way to achieving the objectives of the CBD.  
 
192 Keating at 542 
193 Vnerux at 11 
194 Power at 119 
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5 Conclusion 
 
It is important that both TRIPS and the CBD are implemented in a supportive manner. 
Technology plays an important role in the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity. TRIPS has the aim of encouraging innovation by providing a mechanism to 
the inventor whereby they may profit from their innovation and furthermore recoup the 
costs of research and development. The CBD recognises technology as a key mechanism 
for carrying out its objects.   
 
The CBD provisions relating to TT and the provisions under TRIPS which provide for 
the patentability of inventions and exclusive rights of the rights holder could potentially 
conflict rendering the objectives of the CBD difficult to achieve. However, the two 
agreements are not completely irreconcilable and a “real” conflict can be avoided 
through the interpretation of the provisions. By taking advantage of the exceptions laid 
down in TRIPS it is possible to implement the CBD provisions without violating TRIPS. 
It is now necessary for States to implement legislation to this effect. Further, another 
way for States to achieve the objectives of the CBD and obtain TT is through negotiated 
agreements. Such agreements are negotiated on the basis that the host country has the 
authority to provide access to genetic resources which the bio-prospecting firm wants 
and the bio-prospecting firm has the technology which the host country requires. 
Through this mutual need/want, a basis for negotiating a mutually advantageous 
agreement is set.  
 
The importance of IPRs in the continuing benefits of technology and in encouraging TT 
should be recognised when implementing the provisions of the CBD. That is that the 
protection of IPRs further encourages the transfer of technology and also fosters 
innovation (of new ESTs or biotechnological inventions that sustainably use genetic 
resources or conserve biodiversity). In addition in regards to patentability issues it 
should be recognised that without requiring patent applicants to enter into benefit 
sharing arrangements before a patent will be granted, it is less likely that firms will 
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actually seek and exploit benefit sharing with the host country195. This will serve to 
undermine the objectives of the CBD. 
 
Some States have already implemented legislation and entered into agreements in a 
manner that is mutually supportive for both the CBD and TRIPS. It is a matter of time 
before the success or otherwise of these will be seen. However, it is possible for States 
to implement the CBD without violating TRIPS and this should be done in order that the 
objectives of the CBD are carried out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 Curci, 2005, at 16 
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